Mental models and existential graphs: How to define a rule
DOI: 10.23951/2312-7899-2024-2-32-56
The article draws a parallel between Charles Sanders Peirce’s theory of existential graphs and Philip Johnson-Laird’s theory of mental models. The existential graphs (EG) theory is a diagrammatic logical theory. Its deductive capacities are approximately compared with propositional logic, first-order predicate logic, modal logic, and higher-order logics (this section was not completed). In draft notes, Peirce also speculates on the extent to which diagrams can work beyond deduction. The mental models (MM) theory is a psychological theory, which is developed within the framework of the psychology of reasoning. It states that people reason by constructing, combining, revising, and eliminating models that are compatible with given information. In its time, EG theory had a significant impact on the development of MM theory. This article evaluates this influence. In addition, it declares possible ways for their further interaction since modern studies of Peirce’s and MM theories provide new materials. Both theories rely on iconicity and the economy of research; they prefer singular representations to sets and try to model the way in which thoughts are connected. Graphs, like models, can overcome limitations of language linearity. At the same time, they logically represent information processing, i.e. they serve both logical and cognitive purposes. That is why EG theory can specify the process of obtaining conclusions in the theory of MM. I suggest that this can be done by incorporating Peirce’s guiding principle into EG theory and extending this idea to the theory of MM. This principle is a fundamental logical rule, which directs the course of reasoning. It helps to systematise information and draw conclusions, but it cannot be fully represented by signs; therefore, it cannot be reduced to the rules of logical theories. Such rules only describe its steps. I show, how the general logical rule iconically manifests itself within the theory of EG, how specific rules of logical theories reflect its core characteristics and how this rule is integrated into MM theory despite the fact that the latter denies specific rules of logical theories. With such integration, MM theory becomes more dynamic. Finally, the article claims that Peirce’s theory can also contribute to analyses of the dichotomy of embodied or amodal representation. It is useful for clarifying complex aspects of two reasoning systems (system one and system two) collaboration. Both of these aspects are crucial for MM theory. However, they deserve their own attention, since they expect an appeal to both the means of EG theory and diagrammatic elaborations, which Peirce attributed to its pre-theoretical level.
Keywords: existential graphs, mental models, guiding principle, rule of logic, pragmatism, psychology of reasoning
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Issue: 2, 2024
Series of issue: Issue 2
Rubric: ARTICLES
Pages: 32 — 56
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