ON A SEMANTIC THEORY OF ORDINARY LANGUAGE (RESPONSE TO OPPONENTS)

Ladov Vsevolod A.

DOI: 10.23951/2312-7899-2022-3-145-152

Information About Author:

Vsevolod A. Ladov, Tomsk Scientific Center, Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russian Federation. Tomsk State University, Russian Federation. E-mail: ladov@yandex.ru

This article is the final remark in the discussion on issues related to the construction of a semantic theory of ordinary language. Is a semantic theory of ordinary language possible? What form should this theory take? Is it possible to revive Gottlob Frege’s semantics in modern analytic philosophy? Can Jerrold Katz’s linguistic Platonism claim the status of a semantic theory of ordinary language? Is the concept “meaning as use” of the later Ludwig Wittgenstein a semantic theory? The participants of the discussion tried to answer these questions. The author of this article gives a brief summary of the positions presented in the discussion and draws general conclusions.

Keywords: Frege, Wittgenstein, Katz, analytic philosophy, language, semantics, sense, meaning

References:

Katz, J. (1990). The Metaphysics of Meaning. MIT Press.

Kripke, S. A. (2005). Wittgenstein on rules and privaye language. Tomsk State University. (In Russian).

Kusch, M. (2006). A Sceptical Guide to Meaning and Rules. Acumen.

Ladov, V. (2019). Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus and a Hierarchical Approach to Solving Logical Paradoxes. Filosofija. Sociologija, 30(1), 36–43.

Ladov, V. A. (2017). Logical Paradoxes Solution in Semantically Closed Language. Epistemologiya i filosofiya nauki – Epistemology & Philosophy of Science, 52(2), 104–119. (In Russian). DOI: 10.5840/eps201752233

Wittgenstein, L. (2018). Filosofskie issledovaniya [Philosophical Investigations]. Translated from German. AST.

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Issue: 3, 2022

Series of issue: Issue 3

Rubric: ARTICLES. LANGUAGE MEANING AND LINGUISTIC REALISM IN CONTEXT OF ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY

Pages: 145 — 152

Downloads: 1237